Massacres and displacement in Arakan

During the Second World War, extensive intercommunal violence broke out in Arakan. For the Rohingya people, 1942 became one of the most traumatic chapters in their history. According to the Rohingya historical understanding, the conflict did not arise only spontaneously between communities; it was also orchestrated by Burmese politicians and Rakhine nationalists in cooperation with the Japanese army. The Rohingya were accused of collaborating with British forces, an accusation many Rohingya regard as deliberate propaganda used to justify attacks, massacres and displacement.

During this period, many Rohingya villages in upper Arakan were burned down, and large numbers of people—men, women, children and older people—were killed with swords, bows and other local weapons. According to Rohingya sources, more than 140,000 people were killed or displaced. Those who survived largely fled to northern Arakan, especially Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung. This is one reason why very few Rohingya remain today in many towns of upper Arakan.

For the Rohingya, the 1942 massacres remain a collective trauma and an early warning of how dangerous a political power vacuum, ethnic hatred and nationalist propaganda can become. In Rohingya collective memory, the Kaladan River is described as filled with the blood of murdered Rohingya—a powerful symbol of the brutality and suffering inflicted on the people during this period.

The Rohingya enjoyed ordinary rights after Burma’s independence

After Burma gained independence in 1948, the Rohingya for a period enjoyed ordinary civil and political rights on a par with other ethnic groups in the country. They were not always free from discrimination, and Arakan was still marked by unrest, the aftermath of the Second World War and tensions among different communities. Nevertheless, history shows that the Rohingya were not completely excluded from the state at that time. They could vote in elections, participate in political life and elect their own representatives to parliament.

Several Rohingya leaders and Muslim representatives from northern Arakan were elected to Burma’s parliament after independence. This is important historical evidence that the Rohingya once had a recognised place in the country’s political system. One of the best known was Sultan Mahmud of Buthidaung, who was elected to parliament and later held a ministerial post in U Nu’s government. The fact that a Rohingya could become a member of parliament and a minister in the Burmese government clearly shows that Rohingya were not regarded as illegal foreigners during the early post-independence period.

Burma’s first president, Sao Shwe Thaik, himself an ethnic Shan leader, is also reported to have recognised the Muslims of Arakan as part of Burma’s indigenous peoples. He reportedly stated that if the Muslims of Arakan could not be considered one of Burma’s indigenous groups, neither could the Shan and other ethnic groups be considered indigenous. This statement is important because it shows that central leaders in the early independence period recognised Rohingya belonging to Burma. It stands in sharp contrast to later propaganda portraying Rohingya as foreign immigrants with no historical connection to Arakan.

The Rohingya also had cultural and linguistic rights. The Rohingya language was formerly used in broadcasts by the Burma Broadcasting Service. This constituted public recognition of Rohingya language and identity. When a people’s language is given a place in state media, it shows that the state at one time accepted that people as part of the country’s diversity. For the Rohingya, this is strong historical evidence that their identity was once visible and accepted in public life.

Another important example was the establishment of the Mayu Frontier District in 1961. This area mainly comprised Rohingya-majority parts of northern Arakan, especially Maungdaw, Buthidaung and parts of Rathedaung. It was administered directly by the central government in Rangoon. For the Rohingya, this represented a form of administrative recognition of their presence and their particular situation in northern Arakan.

Military rule and increasing exclusion

After General Ne Win’s military coup in 1962, the situation of the Rohingya people changed dramatically. The democratic period from 1948 to 1962—with political representation, voting rights, public office, Rohingya-language radio broadcasts and administrative recognition—was rapidly dismantled. The junta introduced an authoritarian, nationalist and Buddhist-influenced policy that gradually marginalised minorities, particularly Muslims in Rakhine.

The government dissolved Rohingya organisations and social and political structures. Identity cards were confiscated or not renewed under the pretext of “checks,” causing many to lose proof of citizenship. Restrictions were imposed on movement, education, public-sector employment and property rights. Rohingya were increasingly portrayed as “foreigners” or “Bengali immigrants” rather than an integral part of Burma. The 1974 Constitution reinforced this trend by disqualifying many Rohingya from citizenship. This was not a sudden process, but a systematic political strategy to undermine their historical belonging and rights. From being recognised citizens, they were gradually rendered stateless in practice.

Operation Nagamin

This period culminated in Operation Dragon King, or Nagamin, a military and immigration operation launched in February 1978. The official justification was to register citizens and identify “illegal immigrants” before a census in northern Arakan/Rakhine. In practice, it became a sweeping campaign against the Rohingya population.

There were mass arrests, raids, torture, rape, killings and the burning of villages and mosques. Soldiers and immigration officials confiscated documents, destroyed property and imposed forced labour. An estimated 200,000 to 250,000 Rohingya—up to 300,000 according to some sources—fled across the border into Bangladesh within a few months. This was the first major mass exodus of the modern era.

Refugees described systematic abuses, including summary executions and sexual violence. Bangladesh opened temporary camps where organisations such as Médecins Sans Frontières provided aid under extremely difficult conditions. Many later returned under pressure or pursuant to agreements, but the operation marked the beginning of a recurring cycle of displacement and statelessness.

The Citizenship Law

The 1982 Citizenship Law became one of the most decisive legal instruments in the systematic exclusion of the Rohingya people from Burma/Myanmar. Before this law, Rohingya had participated for decades in the country’s political and public life. They had voting rights, their own parliamentary representatives, public offices and state recognition, including broadcasts in the Rohingya language. The 1982 law fundamentally changed this by linking full citizenship to membership in specified “national races” that the state claimed had lived in the country before the British colonial period.

The political architect behind the law was General Ne Win and his military one-party regime. Ne Win’s rule was characterised by Burman nationalism, distrust of people of South Asian and Chinese background, and a desire to control who could belong to the state. The law was therefore not merely an administrative document, but an ideological tool for defining who belonged to the nation and who would be treated as foreign. State bodies under the military regime conducted the legal work, but the political direction came from Ne Win’s regime.

Rakhine nationalists also played an important role in shaping the political atmosphere around the Rohingya issue. For many years, Rakhine nationalist circles portrayed Rohingya as illegal immigrants from Bengal despite their long historical presence in Arakan. Several Rohingya leaders and rights activists have pointed out that the law’s use of the designation “Rakhine” rather than the broader historical term “Arakanese” helped exclude Rohingya Muslims from Arakan’s history and Burma’s community of citizens. Rakhine nationalist propaganda and Ne Win’s Burman military nationalism thus converged in a policy that deprived Rohingya of legal rights.

The result was catastrophic. Rohingya were gradually rendered stateless and lost the protection normally afforded to citizens. Without citizenship, they faced severe movement restrictions, limited access to education, health care and employment, and increasing control over marriage, family life and births. Many could not travel between villages without permission. They could not freely study, own property, hold public office or participate fully in political life.

The law also created statelessness across generations. Children born to stateless parents became stateless themselves, causing discrimination to be inherited from one generation to the next. The Citizenship Law therefore became more than legislation; it became a mechanism for destroying Rohingya identity, rights and their future in their own homeland.

After 1982, the law was used together with other administrative measures, including citizenship checks, identity cards and later National Verification Cards. These schemes pressured Rohingya to accept an identity as “foreigners” or “Bengali” instead of recognising them as Rohingya and as a people with historical ties to Arakan. The law thereby became a foundation for further discrimination, displacement, segregation and ultimately the grave crimes later committed against the Rohingya.

The 1982 Citizenship Law therefore stands as a central turning point in modern Rohingya history. It did not merely make Rohingya stateless; it legalised a wider political campaign to deny them identity, history, rights and belonging. It gave the authorities a legal vocabulary for carrying out discrimination and gave Rakhine and Burman nationalists a political instrument for portraying Rohingya as foreigners in their own country.

A new military operation and mass exodus

In 1991–1992, the Rohingya people were again subjected to a large-scale military operation in northern Arakan. This period is regarded as one of the largest mass exoduses before the 2017 genocide. The Burmese military junta, known as SLORC, strengthened its control over Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung, and the Rohingya population faced serious abuses, forced labour, violence, harassment and systematic oppression.

Many described the operation as a new phase in the state’s policy of pushing Rohingya out of Arakan. Soldiers and local authorities forced Rohingya civilians to work without pay, including building roads and military camps, serving as porters and doing other heavy labour for the army. Many families also faced arbitrary taxation, confiscation of property, arrest, physical abuse and religious persecution. Mosques and religious leaders were monitored, and Rohingya freedom of movement was severely restricted.

The abuses generated great fear in the villages. Many Rohingya felt they no longer had any security in their own homeland. Women feared sexual violence, men feared arrest and forced labour, and families feared their children would grow up without rights, education or safety. As a result, an estimated 250,000 to 300,000 Rohingya fled across the border into Bangladesh, most crossing the Naf River or travelling through dangerous border areas to Teknaf and Cox’s Bazar.

Bangladesh received the large refugee influx, and Rohingya were placed in numerous camps in Cox’s Bazar District. At the peak, around twenty camps were established. For many, the flight was traumatic. They arrived with little or nothing after leaving homes, land, livestock, documents and family property in Arakan. Many lost relatives during the journey or in military abuses before reaching Bangladesh.

After several years, Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar and UNHCR began a major repatriation process. Most refugees from this period were eventually returned to Arakan between 1993 and 1997, but the process was highly controversial. Many did not want to return because the original causes of flight remained unresolved: they still lacked citizenship, continued to face discrimination and remained at risk of forced labour, arbitrary control and movement restrictions. Human-rights organisations therefore criticised the process and argued that many returns were not genuinely voluntary, safe and dignified.

Although the majority were repatriated, the refugee crisis did not end. Several thousand Rohingya from the 1991–1992 period remained in Bangladesh, especially in the older Kutupalong and Nayapara camps. Others lived outside official camps without formal refugee status. Many had no full right to work, education or free movement. For these families, life in Bangladesh became prolonged uncertainty, poverty and legal limbo.

Some Rohingya from this period also moved onward to other countries. Some travelled to Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Thailand, India and elsewhere in search of safety, work and a more dignified life. The 1991–1992 exodus thus also expanded the Rohingya diaspora, and many Rohingya families abroad today have roots in this wave of displacement.

The years 1991–1992 therefore constitute an important turning point in modern Rohingya history. This was not merely a temporary refugee crisis but part of a longer process in which statelessness, military control, forced labour, violence and systematic discrimination pushed Rohingya out of Arakan. The flight to Bangladesh again showed that the Rohingya problem was not simply poverty or local conflict, but political and legal persecution that made it impossible for many to live safely in their own homeland.

Violence in Arakan and internal displacement

In 2012, Arakan was again struck by widespread violence with catastrophic consequences for the Rohingya population. The violence began in June after a local criminal case was rapidly exploited by nationalist forces to spread hatred and suspicion against Rohingya Muslims. What was initially portrayed as spontaneous intercommunal violence gradually developed into a broader and more targeted campaign against Rohingya and other Muslim communities in Arakan.

Rohingya villages, neighbourhoods, mosques, shops and homes were attacked and burned. Many people were killed, injured or forced to flee. The consequences were especially severe in Akyab, now known as Sittwe. Before 2012, Rohingya and other Muslims had lived in several parts of the city, traded, worked and participated in its social and economic life. After the attacks, much of the Muslim population was removed from the city. Many Rohingya therefore believe the violence was not merely a spontaneous outbreak of hatred, but a carefully planned and politically supported campaign to rid Akyab of Rohingya.

The result was a dramatic change in the city’s demography. Muslim neighbourhoods were destroyed and most Rohingya were driven into camps outside the city. Aung Mingalar remained Sittwe’s last Muslim quarter, but it too was effectively isolated and surrounded. Residents faced severe movement restrictions, food shortages, limited access to health care and constant fear of renewed attacks.

After the violence, an estimated 125,000 to 140,000 people were internally displaced, most of them Rohingya and other Muslims. Many were placed in IDP camps around Sittwe, Pauktaw, Myebon, Kyaukphyu and other parts of central Rakhine. Initially described as temporary solutions, the camps rapidly developed into long-term places of internment. Rohingya were not allowed to return to their homes even when their houses, plots and property were still identifiable. Instead, military checkpoints, travel restrictions and a system denying them a normal life kept them separated from the rest of the population.

Conditions in the IDP camps have been inhumane. Rohingya lost access to work, commerce, education, health care and freedom of movement. Many children grew up without ordinary schooling. Sick people could not travel freely to hospitals without permission, and many families became wholly dependent on humanitarian assistance for survival. Camps often lacked sufficient food, clean water, sanitation, safe housing and medical treatment. For many Rohingya, the camps were not places of protection but open prisons.

More than a decade later, the consequences of the 2012 violence remain unresolved. Tens of thousands of Rohingya still live in IDP camps and camp-like areas in Rakhine under extremely difficult conditions. They still lack full freedom of movement, citizenship, the right to return to their original homes and effective protection against discrimination. Many families displaced in 2012 remain in temporary and degrading conditions, while a new generation of children has been born and raised in internment.

The 2012 violence was therefore a turning point in modern Rohingya history. It caused not only killings, destruction and displacement but also an enduring policy of segregation and internment. For Rohingya, it began a new phase of persecution in which they were deprived not only of their homes but also of the right to live as free people in their own country.

Name ban, electoral exclusion and boat refugees

The period 2014–2015 marked a new and extremely serious phase in the persecution of the Rohingya people. After the 2012 violence, tens of thousands already lived in closed IDP camps in Rakhine/Arakan under inhumane conditions, deprived of free movement, work, education, health care and the right to return home. Instead of resolving the crisis, Myanmar’s authorities pursued policies in 2014 and 2015 that further removed Rohingya from the country’s legal, political and national community.

One of the clearest examples was the 2014 census, Myanmar’s first nationwide census in decades, conducted with international support. Rohingya hoped it might provide visibility and documentation of their existence in the country. Shortly before enumeration, however, the authorities decided they could not register as “Rohingya.” They were pressured to register as “Bengali,” a term used by authorities and nationalist groups to portray them as foreigners from Bangladesh.

This was not merely a question of terminology. For Rohingya, denial of the name “Rohingya” was a direct attack on their identity, history and belonging to Arakan. When a state denies a people the use of their own name, it becomes easier to deny their rights, citizenship and political existence. The 2014 name ban was therefore seen as part of a wider policy to erase Rohingya identity and force them into an alien category as “Bengali.”

Segregation in Rakhine continued. Rohingya displaced after 2012 were not allowed to return home. Many remained in overcrowded and isolated camps, especially around Sittwe/Akyab. Presented as temporary, the camps became open prisons in practice. Travel required permission, many were denied hospital access, children lost schooling and families became entirely dependent on humanitarian aid. Instead of reconstruction and return, they faced further control, registration and coercion.

In 2015, Rohingya political rights were almost completely removed. Many had previously held temporary identity documents known as “white cards,” which had enabled them to vote in earlier elections, including in 2010. In 2015, President Thein Sein’s government cancelled these cards, depriving hundreds of thousands of Rohingya of the right to vote in the historic November 2015 election.

This electoral exclusion was extremely serious. Rohingya had previously had parliamentary representatives and participated in political life. In 2015, they lost not only voting rights but also the ability to stand as candidates. Several Muslim and Rohingya candidates were rejected on citizenship and documentation grounds. Rohingya were rendered politically invisible even in an election internationally celebrated as a step towards democracy.

The period also brought a dramatic increase in boat refugees. Many Rohingya saw no future in Arakan: they were stateless, interned, denied movement and subjected to daily humiliation and fear. Conditions for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh were also difficult and many had no lawful route to safety. Thousands therefore undertook dangerous journeys across the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea, often towards Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia.

Many boat refugees fell into the hands of smugglers and traffickers. They were crowded into boats and subjected to hunger, violence, torture and extortion. Families paid ransom to free relatives. Some were held in jungle camps on the Thailand–Malaysia border, where many died from illness, abuse and starvation. In 2015, mass graves discovered in trafficking camps in Thailand exposed the brutal reality behind Rohingya flight.

The 2015 boat crisis became an international symbol of Rohingya desperation. Thousands were stranded at sea when smugglers abandoned boats and regional states refused disembarkation. Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia were criticised for pushing boats back or denying refugees safe harbour. Many Rohingya died at sea, while others were rescued after days or weeks without adequate food and water.

The years 2014–2015 therefore show that persecution operated not only through direct violence but through administrative and political measures. First their name was denied in the census, then voting rights and political participation were removed. They were held in camps and denied normal life; when many fled, they became victims of trafficking, death at sea and regional pushbacks.

This period laid the groundwork for the still greater catastrophe of 2016 and 2017. Rohingya were first made stateless, then segregated, politically excluded and finally pushed to sea or into camps. The years 2014–2015 were not isolated, but a decisive phase in the systematic process intended to make Rohingya invisible, rightless and foreign in their own homeland.

Rohingya were denied the right to identify as Rohingya in the census and lost political rights. At the same time, many fled by sea towards Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.

“Clearance operations” begin

The period 2014–2015 marked a new and extremely serious phase in the persecution of the Rohingya people. After the 2012 violence, tens of thousands already lived in closed IDP camps in Rakhine/Arakan under inhumane conditions, deprived of free movement, work, education, health care and the right to return home. Instead of resolving the crisis, Myanmar’s authorities pursued policies in 2014 and 2015 that further removed Rohingya from the country’s legal, political and national community.

One of the clearest examples was the 2014 census, Myanmar’s first nationwide census in decades, conducted with international support. Rohingya hoped it might provide visibility and documentation of their existence in the country. Shortly before enumeration, however, the authorities decided they could not register as “Rohingya.” They were pressured to register as “Bengali,” a term used by authorities and nationalist groups to portray them as foreigners from Bangladesh.

This was not merely a question of terminology. For Rohingya, denial of the name “Rohingya” was a direct attack on their identity, history and belonging to Arakan. When a state denies a people the use of their own name, it becomes easier to deny their rights, citizenship and political existence. The 2014 name ban was therefore seen as part of a wider policy to erase Rohingya identity and force them into an alien category as “Bengali.”

Segregation in Rakhine continued. Rohingya displaced after 2012 were not allowed to return home. Many remained in overcrowded and isolated camps, especially around Sittwe/Akyab. Presented as temporary, the camps became open prisons in practice. Travel required permission, many were denied hospital access, children lost schooling and families became entirely dependent on humanitarian aid. Instead of reconstruction and return, they faced further control, registration and coercion.

In 2015, Rohingya political rights were almost completely removed. Many had previously held temporary identity documents known as “white cards,” which had enabled them to vote in earlier elections, including in 2010. In 2015, President Thein Sein’s government cancelled these cards, depriving hundreds of thousands of Rohingya of the right to vote in the historic November 2015 election.

This electoral exclusion was extremely serious. Rohingya had previously had parliamentary representatives and participated in political life. In 2015, they lost not only voting rights but also the ability to stand as candidates. Several Muslim and Rohingya candidates were rejected on citizenship and documentation grounds. Rohingya were rendered politically invisible even in an election internationally celebrated as a step towards democracy.

The period also brought a dramatic increase in boat refugees. Many Rohingya saw no future in Arakan: they were stateless, interned, denied movement and subjected to daily humiliation and fear. Conditions for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh were also difficult and many had no lawful route to safety. Thousands therefore undertook dangerous journeys across the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea, often towards Malaysia, Thailand or Indonesia.

Many boat refugees fell into the hands of smugglers and traffickers. They were crowded into boats and subjected to hunger, violence, torture and extortion. Families paid ransom to free relatives. Some were held in jungle camps on the Thailand–Malaysia border, where many died from illness, abuse and starvation. In 2015, mass graves discovered in trafficking camps in Thailand exposed the brutal reality behind Rohingya flight.

The 2015 boat crisis became an international symbol of Rohingya desperation. Thousands were stranded at sea when smugglers abandoned boats and regional states refused disembarkation. Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia were criticised for pushing boats back or denying refugees safe harbour. Many Rohingya died at sea, while others were rescued after days or weeks without adequate food and water.

The years 2014–2015 therefore show that persecution operated not only through direct violence but through administrative and political measures. First their name was denied in the census, then voting rights and political participation were removed. They were held in camps and denied normal life; when many fled, they became victims of trafficking, death at sea and regional pushbacks.

This period laid the groundwork for the still greater catastrophe of 2016 and 2017. Rohingya were first made stateless, then segregated, politically excluded and finally pushed to sea or into camps. The years 2014–2015 were not isolated, but a decisive phase in the systematic process intended to make Rohingya invisible, rightless and foreign in their own homeland.

The genocide campaign and mass flight to Bangladesh

On 25 August 2017, Myanmar’s military began one of the most brutal campaigns in modern Rohingya history. The authorities claimed the operation was a response to attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) on security posts in northern Rakhine. But the military response was not confined to armed individuals. It rapidly developed into a broad campaign of violence against the entire Rohingya population of Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung.

Myanmar’s military, border police and allied local forces attacked Rohingya villages with extreme brutality. Villages were surrounded, homes set on fire, civilians shot, women and girls subjected to sexual violence, and families forced to flee through forests, mountains and rivers towards Bangladesh. Many older people, children and sick people died during the journey. Others were killed in their villages before they could escape. For the Rohingya, this was not merely a military operation, but a coordinated campaign to remove them from their homeland.

Reports by the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Médecins Sans Frontières and other human-rights organisations documented widespread patterns of killings, mass rape, torture, arbitrary arrest, village burnings and the destruction of religious and civilian property. Entire villages were razed. Mosques, schools, shops and homes were destroyed in many places. The devastation was so extensive that satellite imagery later revealed systematic fires and the removal of Rohingya settlements.

UN investigators later concluded that there were grounds to investigate Myanmar’s senior military leaders for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The UN described the military’s actions as systematic and targeted and identified patterns of extreme violence, hate speech, discrimination and prolonged persecution. This showed that the 2017 violence did not arise in isolation, but formed part of a long-term policy in which Rohingya were first made stateless, then segregated, deprived of political rights and finally expelled through violence.

Within a few months, more than 700,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. Many international sources place the number above 730,000 or 750,000. When refugees from earlier waves were included, the total Rohingya population in Bangladesh eventually exceeded one million. Bangladesh opened its border and received the refugees, particularly in Cox’s Bazar, where Kutupalong and Balukhali developed into the world’s largest refugee settlement.

The refugees arriving in Bangladesh carried powerful testimonies of massacres, rape, burned villages and families torn apart. Many said soldiers shot civilians trying to escape, threw children into burning houses, raped women and girls and burned entire villages after driving out their inhabitants. Médecins Sans Frontières estimated that at least several thousand Rohingya, including many children, were killed during the first month after 25 August 2017.

For the Rohingya, 2017 was not only a mass exodus but a genocide and a national catastrophe. They lost homes, land, documents, relatives, religious sites and the entire histories of their villages. Many villages from which they fled were subsequently destroyed, occupied or made inaccessible, making safe, voluntary and dignified return almost impossible.

The international response later led to legal proceedings before the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court and UN independent investigative mechanisms. Yet most victims still have not obtained justice. Many military leaders responsible for the violence continued to wield power in Myanmar, while Rohingya remained without citizenship, protection or the right to safe return.

The year 2017 therefore stands as the darkest turning point in recent Rohingya history. The campaign showed how decades of discrimination, statelessness, hate propaganda and military control could develop into genocide and mass displacement. For the Rohingya people, 2017 is not merely a date, but a symbol of the loss of their homeland, the loss of thousands of lives and the continuing struggle for justice, citizenship and safe return to Arakan.

International legal proceedings

After the 2017 genocide campaign, international pressure to hold Myanmar accountable increased. For the first time, the Rohingya case entered the leading international judicial institutions, and documentation of the crimes moved into a new phase. Survivors, witnesses, human-rights organisations and international investigators began collecting extensive evidence of killings, mass rape, forced displacement, village burnings and other grave crimes.

On 11 November 2019, The Gambia, supported by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, filed a case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The case is based on the 1948 Genocide Convention and alleges that Myanmar breached its international obligations by committing and failing to prevent genocide against the Rohingya people.

In December 2019, Myanmar appeared before the Court, where the country’s then leader Aung San Suu Kyi personally defended the state and rejected the genocide allegations. She argued that the military’s actions formed part of a lawful military operation against armed insurgents. Rohingya and numerous international human-rights organisations rejected this explanation, pointing to extensive evidence that the violence targeted civilians and pursued a much broader objective than combating an armed group.

On 23 January 2020, the ICJ issued a historic decision ordering provisional measures. It directed Myanmar to take all necessary steps to prevent acts that could constitute genocide against the Rohingya, ensure that military and other armed forces did not commit such acts, preserve evidence relating to the crimes and report regularly to the Court on the measures taken. Although not a final judgment, the decision represented important international recognition of the gravity of the Rohingya situation.

Other international mechanisms simultaneously continued accountability work. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar, established by the UN Human Rights Council, collected and analysed witness testimony, satellite imagery, documents, videos and other evidence for future criminal cases. The aim was to ensure that those responsible could one day be tried before international or national courts.

For the Rohingya, these legal proceedings offered important hope of justice after decades of impunity. Many survivors testified about massacres, sexual violence, torture and forced displacement. Although the processes moved slowly, 2019–2020 marked a historic turning point in which Rohingya suffering was no longer described solely as a humanitarian crisis but also as a matter of international criminal responsibility.

Despite these advances, Rohingya continued to live in extremely difficult conditions. Around one million refugees remained in camps in Bangladesh, while hundreds of thousands continued to face discrimination, statelessness and movement restrictions in Myanmar. International legal proceedings were therefore an important step towards accountability, but not an immediate solution to Rohingya suffering.

The coup and renewed nationwide violence

On 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s military staged a coup and seized power from the civilian government. The coup plunged the entire country into a new and profound crisis. Large popular protests were met with brutal violence, mass arrests, torture and killings. The situation gradually developed into nationwide armed conflict among the military junta, the democracy movement and various ethnic armed groups.

For the Rohingya people, the coup made the prospect of protection, justice and safe return even more remote. The same military institution accused of the 2017 genocide against the Rohingya once again became the dominant power in the country. This reinforced impunity and showed that those responsible for earlier crimes still controlled the state’s weapons, administration and security apparatus.

Rohingya in Arakan remained without citizenship, freedom of movement or genuine protection. Those still living in Myanmar faced severe restrictions, discrimination and fear. Many Rohingya in IDP camps and villages continued to have limited access to work, education, health care and humanitarian aid. The coup made conditions even more uncertain because nationwide war weakened all civilian administration and made humanitarian access more difficult.

For Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, the coup sharply diminished hope of safe, voluntary and dignified return. Refugees wanted to return to their homeland, but not to a country ruled by the same military junta that had driven them out. Without citizenship, security, rights, restitution of property and international guarantees, return could be neither safe nor dignified.

The coup also affected international legal proceedings. The ICJ case, ICC investigation and UN evidence collection continued, but the junta’s seizure of power made it more difficult to secure Myanmar’s cooperation with international mechanisms. Impunity therefore became even more evident while the need for international accountability grew more urgent.

After 2021, Myanmar experienced increasingly widespread conflict. Millions were internally displaced across the country and thousands fled to neighbouring states. This new wave of violence showed that the military threatened not only the Rohingya but Myanmar’s entire population. Yet Rohingya remained among the most vulnerable because they were already stateless, segregated and deprived of fundamental rights before the coup.

The 2021 coup therefore made the Rohingya crisis even more entrenched. It destroyed prospects for a short-term political solution, increased the danger of new abuses and made safe return almost impossible. For the Rohingya, 2021 was further proof that their future cannot be entrusted to the military or authorities that deny their identity, citizenship and fundamental human rights. A lasting solution requires international protection, justice, full citizenship, security and guarantees that Rohingya can return to Arakan as a recognised people with equal rights.

New danger from both the junta and the Arakan Army

From late 2023, and especially during 2024–2026, the Rohingya people in Arakan entered a new and extremely dangerous phase. Fighting between Myanmar’s junta and the Arakan Army spread across large parts of Rakhine/Arakan, once again trapping Rohingya between armed actors that had both shown a willingness to use them as instruments, treat them with suspicion and subject them to serious abuses.

In 2024, the junta that had previously carried out the 2017 genocide campaign began forcibly recruiting Rohingya men and boys for its war against the Arakan Army. This was particularly brutal because the same state that denied Rohingya citizenship, identity and fundamental rights now sought to force them to fight and die for the military. Many were taken at night, threatened, beaten, given brief military training and sent to the front line. For Rohingya, this was a new form of exploitation of an already persecuted and stateless population.

At the same time, the Arakan Army developed from a Rakhine insurgent group into the dominant power across much of Arakan. As it gained control, Rohingya increasingly feared that the group did not seek an inclusive Arakan, but a territory from which Rohingya would be removed, controlled or forced out. Rohingya reported movement restrictions, confiscation of property, arbitrary arrests, forced labour, forced recruitment, threats and attacks on villages.

Buthidaung became one of the clearest symbols of this new catastrophe. After the township fell under Arakan Army control in May 2024, large parts of the Rohingya areas in and around the town were burned. Rohingya sources reported that several thousand homes, including an estimated 2,500-plus houses in Buthidaung town, were destroyed in a very short time. International media and human-rights actors also documented extensive fire damage, targeted destruction and mass flight. Rohingya viewed this not as incidental fighting, but as part of a pattern in which remaining Rohingya areas were emptied, burned and made uninhabitable.

The Hoyyar Siri massacre is among the most serious documented examples of this development. Human Rights Watch reported in 2026 that the Arakan Army may have killed at least 170 Rohingya men, women and children at Hoyyar Siri on 2 May 2024, with many more possibly killed or injured. Survivors described civilians shot while attempting to flee, families killed, the village later looted and burned, and residents still unable to return. For Rohingya, Hoyyar Siri is not an isolated event, but one of many violent episodes displaying clear features of ethnic persecution and genocide-like patterns.

Flight from Arakan has therefore continued. Since 2024, tens of thousands—and according to some estimates as many as 150,000 to 200,000 Rohingya—have fled to Bangladesh because of violence, fear, forced recruitment, food shortages and abuses by both the junta and the Arakan Army. Many cross without formal registration and live in extreme uncertainty in or around the already overcrowded Cox’s Bazar camps. Others attempt onward journeys by boat to Malaysia, Indonesia or other countries, often through dangerous smuggling networks.

The situation shows that Rohingya no longer face danger only from Myanmar’s military. They now also face grave danger from the Arakan Army, which effectively controls much of the area where the remaining Rohingya live. RCN therefore believes the international community must not view the Arakan Army solely as an anti-junta movement or local administrative actor. It must be judged by its treatment of civilians, especially Rohingya.

RCN believes the current situation must be treated as an acute protection crisis. Rohingya in Arakan need immediate international protection, humanitarian access, monitoring and independent investigation of all parties. The junta, the Arakan Army and any Rohingya armed groups must be held accountable for abuses against civilians. The international community must not permit the history of 2017 to recur in a new form, with the remaining Rohingya gradually forced out through fear, violence, hunger, forced recruitment and village destruction.

For the Rohingya, 2024–2026 is therefore a new existential crisis. After the 2017 genocide, many believed the international community would prevent another catastrophe. Yet the remaining Rohingya in Arakan are again displaced, attacked and denied the possibility of living safely in their homeland. RCN believes this requires a clear international response: independent investigation, humanitarian access, civilian protection, sanctions against responsible actors and a political solution recognising Rohingya rights to citizenship, security, property and full belonging in Arakan.