When the Rohingya are discussed internationally, the story often begins in August 2017. Myanmar’s armed forces then launched extensive operations in northern Rakhine State. Villages were burned, civilians were killed, and women and girls were subjected to widespread sexual violence. More than 750,000 people fled across the border into Bangladesh.

But 2017 was not the beginning. It was the result of a much older process through which the Rohingya were gradually deprived of citizenship, identity and historical belonging. To understand how this persecution became possible, we must examine how history was first politicised and then used as a weapon.

Arakan – a border region, not an isolated world

The historical homeland of the Rohingya lies in the northern part of present-day Rakhine State, formerly known as Arakan. Situated on the Bay of Bengal between the Burmese interior and Bengal, Arakan was a meeting place between South Asia and Southeast Asia for centuries.

Merchants, sailors, religious scholars, soldiers and workers travelled along its coast. Buddhist, Muslim and Hindu traditions encountered and influenced one another. During the Kingdom of Mrauk U, which existed from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, Arakan maintained particularly close political, economic and cultural connections with Bengal. Its Buddhist kings also adopted Persian and Muslim court traditions, while Muslims held various positions within the kingdom.

This does not mean that the modern Rohingya identity existed in precisely the same form throughout all these centuries. Modern ethnic identities develop over time. That is true of the Rohingya, the Rakhine, the Bamar majority and many other peoples.

The essential historical question is therefore not whether a modern ethnic group has remained completely unchanged for a thousand years. No population could meet such a standard. The important point is that Arakan had a long-established Muslim population, while later migration also occurred. The Rohingya identity emerged from this complex regional history.

Historians continue to debate how the name “Rohingya” was used during different periods and how the identity became politically organised during the twentieth century. Recent research demonstrates the close relationship between censuses, ethnic classifications, nation-building and the dispute over Rohingya identity. Historical disagreement, however, cannot cancel a living population’s right to identity, citizenship and equality.

Read the research on Rohingya identity, nationhood and the census

Colonial rule transformed both the population and the borders

Following the First Anglo-Burmese War, Britain took control of Arakan in 1826. The region was incorporated into British India, and the colonial economy encouraged increased labour migration from Bengal to Arakan.

This migration is an important part of the history, but it is often presented in a misleading way. Under British rule, Bengal and Arakan belonged to the same empire. The present international border between Bangladesh and Myanmar did not function as it does today. The British largely regarded this movement as internal migration within the colony, not illegal immigration into a sovereign country.

The colonial administration also divided the population into fixed categories through censuses and official registers. Flexible local identities were transformed into rigid “racial” and ethnic classifications. These categories later acquired enormous political importance.

British policies also contributed to economic and ethnic tensions. Many Buddhist Rakhine experienced a loss of land, political authority and economic control. Migration and colonial inequality generated mistrust that later nationalist movements could exploit.

Acknowledging migration during the colonial period does not mean that the entire Rohingya population can be described as recent foreigners. The population included people with different family histories: descendants of older Muslim communities in Arakan, families who moved during the colonial period, and people with connections on both sides of a frontier that only later became a strict international border.

The Second World War left deep wounds

When Japan invaded Burma in 1942, the colonial administration collapsed. Rakhine experienced severe intercommunal violence. Many Buddhist Rakhine supported Burmese nationalist forces that initially cooperated with Japan, while many Muslims in the north supported the British.

Both Muslim and Buddhist communities suffered attacks, killings and displacement. The geographical pattern of the violence contributed to northern Arakan becoming more predominantly Muslim, while southern areas became more predominantly Buddhist.

Memories of 1942 continue to influence both communities. When only one community’s suffering is remembered, history can reinforce hostility. Responsible history must recognise abuses committed against both populations without using past violence to justify collective punishment in the present.

From participation to exclusion

After Burma gained independence in 1948, the legal and political position of the Rohingya was different from what it is today. Rohingya politicians participated in elections and served in parliament. The name “Rohingya” was used publicly, including in state broadcasting. Some members of the community possessed citizenship documents and held public office.

Conflict also existed. A Muslim mujahideen movement operated in parts of northern Arakan after independence. But the existence of an armed rebellion does not make an entire civilian population responsible. Myanmar has experienced numerous ethnic armed movements without this legitimately allowing the state to deprive every member of those communities of citizenship.

The military coup of 1962 became a turning point. General Ne Win’s regime promoted an increasingly narrow idea of national belonging. People with connections to South Asia were progressively portrayed as foreigners, even when their families had lived in the country for generations.

During the military’s Operation Nagamin in 1978, approximately 200,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. Many later returned following international pressure. Another mass exodus occurred in 1991–1992. It is therefore misleading to describe 2017 as a sudden eruption of violence: mass displacement had already become a recurring pattern.

View the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s timeline of Rohingya history

The 1982 Citizenship Law

The most decisive legal change came with the 1982 Citizenship Law. It established three different categories: full, associate and naturalised citizenship. Full citizenship was largely tied to membership in so-called national ethnic groups whose presence in the country was supposed to predate the first British conquest in 1824.

The Rohingya were not recognised among these groups. Obtaining naturalised citizenship also required documentation that many families did not possess. Some documents had been lost during war and displacement, while the authorities also applied the law arbitrarily and discriminatorily.

The law does not simply state that “all Rohingya are stateless.” However, the combination of its ethnic hierarchy, documentation requirements and discriminatory implementation effectively excluded Rohingya from citizenship on a massive scale. Their statelessness was not a natural consequence of lacking a connection to the country. It was produced through state policy.

The loss of citizenship opened the way to the loss of other rights. The Rohingya faced restrictions on freedom of movement, marriage, family life, education, healthcare and employment. Without citizenship, they were treated as foreigners in their country of birth.

Read the 1982 Citizenship Law through UNHCR Refworld

When the denial of history becomes a political weapon

Myanmar’s authorities have long rejected the name “Rohingya,” referring to the population as “Bengalis” instead. This is not a neutral choice of words. It implies that the entire population truly belongs in Bangladesh, regardless of how many generations their families have lived in Myanmar.

Language thereby becomes part of the persecution. First, the group’s name is rejected. Its historical presence is then disputed. Finally, the group is portrayed as a foreign security threat that the state may control, confine or expel.

History is consequently used to shift the discussion from rights to origins. Instead of asking why people born in Myanmar do not have citizenship, the debate asks whether their ancestors can document their presence before a particular nineteenth-century date.

Such a requirement is rarely applied consistently to other populations. It turns Rohingya history into a permanent trial in which an entire people is expected to prove its innocence and belonging.

From discrimination to mass violence

Following violence in Rakhine in 2012, approximately 140,000 people, predominantly Rohingya, were displaced. Many were confined in camps with severe restrictions on their freedom of movement. Segregation, poverty and denial of essential services became normalised.

In October 2016 and August 2017, the armed group known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army attacked security posts. Myanmar’s military responded with operations directed against a much larger civilian population. The United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission documented killings, mass rape, the widespread burning of villages and forced displacement. It found sufficient grounds to investigate and prosecute senior military leaders for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Read the reports of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar

In 2020, the International Court of Justice ordered Myanmar to take provisional measures to protect the Rohingya and preserve evidence. The genocide case brought by The Gambia remains ongoing. These provisional measures are not a final judgment that genocide has legally been proven, but they demonstrate the seriousness of the alleged crimes and the danger faced by the Rohingya.

Follow The Gambia v. Myanmar before the International Court of Justice

Why this history still matters

Citizenship and equal rights

First, history matters to the question of citizenship. If the Rohingya are accepted as part of Myanmar’s history, it becomes more difficult to defend a system that treats them as temporary guests. A lasting solution requires equal citizenship, not an inferior status that can later be revoked.

The right to a safe return

Second, history matters to the right of return. Refugees in Bangladesh need more than permission to cross the border. A safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return requires rights to nationality, freedom of movement, property, education and security. Without these rights, “return” could mean little more than a transfer from one form of confinement to another.

Justice and accountability

Third, history matters to justice. The atrocities of 2017 must be understood as part of a longer pattern of discrimination, legal exclusion and repeated displacement. Otherwise, the catastrophe risks being treated as an isolated military operation rather than the culmination of decades of policy.

A new generation in exile

Fourth, history matters to Rohingya children growing up in exile. More than half a million Rohingya refugee children live in Bangladesh, and many were born there. Without access to their history, language and culture, a new generation may lose its connection to its homeland long before a political solution becomes possible.

Read UNICEF’s information about the Rohingya refugee crisis

A future democratic Myanmar

Finally, this history matters to Myanmar as a whole. The exclusion of the Rohingya demonstrates the danger of a national identity in which only selected ethnic groups are considered the legitimate owners of the country. A future democratic Myanmar cannot be built upon the military’s old hierarchy between “national races” and people treated as permanent foreigners.

History must accommodate complexity

Defending Rohingya rights does not require presenting a mythical or entirely peaceful past. Arakan has experienced migration, power struggles, colonial transformation and intercommunal violence. The Rakhine population has also suffered war, marginalisation and abuses, both historically and during the present conflict.

But complexity must not be confused with moral uncertainty. No disagreement about the age of an ethnic identity can justify statelessness. Colonial-era migration cannot render descendants born over several generations permanently without rights. The actions of an armed group cannot legitimise collective punishment against an entire civilian population.

The situation remains acute. Conflict in Rakhine has intensified again since 2023. In 2025, the United Nations reported new serious abuses and displacement affecting the Rohingya and other civilians. In 2026, a UN human rights report described the situation of the Rohingya as more perilous than ever.

Read the United Nations report on the situation in Rakhine

A struggle for the right to belong

Rohingya history matters because their exclusion began long before their villages were burned. It began when the state gradually decided that one population should not be allowed to use its own name, should not be recognised as part of the nation, and should not possess the same rights as its neighbours.

Historical recognition is therefore not merely symbolic. It is a prerequisite for citizenship, justice and safe return.

Understanding this history does not mean that every academic question has been conclusively answered. It means rejecting the idea that historical complexity gives a state the right to make people stateless. The future of the Rohingya depends upon their no longer being treated as a problem Myanmar may expel, but as a people whose identity, place and rights must be recognised.

Ultimately, this history concerns a simple but fundamental question: Who is allowed to belong? For far too long, military power has determined the answer for the Rohingya. A just Myanmar must provide a different answer.

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